Amid growing turbulence in the global world order, Pakistan has ended up at the crossroads of increasing geopolitical rivalries and rising tensions. Gabbard, American Director of National Intelligence (DNI), listed Pakistan among possible threats to the homeland of the U.S. alongside such countries as North Korea, China, Russia, and Iran. That is not just the misconception of the dynamics of deterrence of South Asia, but a deadly attempt to generate a threat and a possible other to justify sanctions, coercion, and strategic blackmail.
In such situations, when one of the highest-ranking U.S. officials refers to Pakistan in the same breath as China, Russia, and North Korea when talking about the threats of long-range missiles, it is not analysis, but it is politics. It is the same playbook: exaggerate, inflate, and generalize the threat until it becomes so fine that it falls apart under the pressure of convenience.
Let’s start with an unquestionable range of facts. Pakistan not only lacks the capacity and capability of producing ICBMs, but it is also restricted in its expansion of strategic missiles because of its doctrine. The Shaheen-III is the longest range ballistic missile of Pakistan, and it has a range of approximately 2750 km, which means that it has the capability of covering the entire Indian mainland and its peripheral Islands where the military infrastructures and assets are located.
Even by stretching the technical speculation to its utmost limits, the inventory is regional in its scope and is even intended to discourage the Indian regime from any form of adventurism. There is no tested, deployed, or doctrinally signaled Pakistani ICBM capable of reaching the United States. Missile range alone renders the claim strategically hollow.
Even if it wanted to produce one, it cannot. Islamabad has deliberately maintained a dependency on other states, notably China and the US, for sending its satellites into orbit. If it is an active satellite launch program, then it can be recommended that it has the wherewithal to come up with an ICBM. The fact that a satellite with a rocket can be easily transformed into an ICBM with minor changes.
Washington’s dual policy, silence towards India and discouragement towards Pakistan, in terms of missile production and nuclear weapons, is visible throughout history. In 1998, Washington imposed sanctions on Pakistan after it had tit-for-tat nuclear tests in retaliation for India’s nuclear weapons. Conversely, it entered into a nuclear agreement with New Delhi in 2005, which is against the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which prohibits the transfer of nuclear material to a state that is not a signatory to the treaty.
Could Pakistan extend its range marginally in the future? Possibly not, because the current setup is enough to deter its rival India; its doctrine is explicitly regional. The sophistication of the payloads we can look forward to includes the active development of India’s ICBM systems (Agni-V and others), Multiple targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), and the expansion of its submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) arsenal.
And this would be deterrence stabilization in South Asia, rather than transcontinental adventurism. Because these systems introduce counterforce targeting temptation and second-strike complexities in the regional equation, any incremental adjustment on the behest of Pakistan would not be a revisionist leap towards global strike ambitions, but rather a reactive calibration.
Here lies a contradiction worth exposing. Pakistan, whose behavior concerning operations is defensive-deterrent, the doctrine is declaratively India-centric, and its missile systems are regionally restrained, is reported to be a latent threat to the United States homeland. India, on the other hand, which is actively wielding long-range systems with MIRV potential and an expanding triad, is not. Washington has even supported, either passively or actively, the Indian regime to acquire these capabilities. It is not intelligence; it is rank, disguised as judgment.
The question is not the development of missile capabilities in states; every nuclear power has it. The issue is which capabilities are politicized, and which are normalized. When identical technologies produce alarmism, it is not the missile that is a problem, but rather the political alignment of the state possessing it. Washington’s problem is not with the range, but with autonomy. Pakistan’s deterrent operates outside the orbit of U.S. strategic control. It is not integrated and not aligned. That alone is enough to convert a regional deterrent into a globalized threat narrative.
The debate would have been based on the capability thresholds, patterns of deployment, and doctrinal intent in case the issue was homeland vulnerability. Rather, it is depicted by association and amplification, a method that easily obscures the distinction between those states having various technological and strategic profiles.
By so doing, the United States will have put the credibility of its own intelligence into jeopardy. Its own senator asked the DNI about the huge disparity between the POTUS and the intelligence community, where the intel indicates that Iran is not after a nuclear weapon, and by 2035, it cannot possess an active ICBM, and the president stated that it was facing the imminent nuclear menace. Once all the actors become systemic threats, the term starts losing its meaning.
Pakistan does not need to reach the United States to be relevant in strategic calculations. Its deterrent is for a specific adversary, a specific geography, and a specific balance. To suggest otherwise is not a warning. It is a distortion.
*The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Diplomatic Insight.*
Muhammad Mahad Samija
Muhammad Mahad Samija is a student of Political Science at Government College University, Lahore. He can be reached at muhammadmahadsamija@gmail.com
Suffian Zafar
Suffian Zafar is an Mphil scholar of International Relations at the University of Punjab, Lahore. He is currently working as a Junior Research Fellow at the Maritime Centre of Excellence MCE. He can be reached atsuffianzafarmce@gmail.com
