Pakistan’s Push for Comprehensive Fissile Material Treaty

Reducing the stockpiles of fissile materials and banning its future production is the most reliable way to save mankind from the threat of the use of nuclear weapons. The First Special Session of UNGA on Disarmament outlined that proposals must be negotiated among the member states for devising mechanisms for preventing the use of nuclear weapons and avoiding nuclear war through an international agreement.

With this background, the Fissile Material Cut Off (FM(C)T) was envisioned as a pivotal step towards achieving nuclear disarmament. However, geopolitical imperatives and political expediency of the great powers forced them to halt the negotiations of the FMCT until 1993.

The end of the Cold War created a security environment in which five nuclear powers were comfortable to kickstart the negotiations on FMCT under the Shannon mandate. Under this mandate, there was no explicit reference to the issue of existing stocks; however, it had a provision allowing other states to raise concerns if any. 

Pakistan remains steadfast in advocating a universally verifiable, indiscriminate fissile material treaty that covers the existing stockpile of fissile material, alongside banning the future production. Pakistan’s perspective hinges on the fact that a fissile material treaty must not aggravate the existing asymmetries of the stockpile, but rather address it.

If this treaty fails to include the existing stocks, it is likely that nuclear powers will build more weapons from it, and neither the objective of nuclear non-proliferation nor disarmament will be achieved. Pakistan’s concerns are based on the expanding Indo-US nuclear commerce, the NSG waiver given to India, and its admission to the MTCR.

Read More: Pakistan’s Position on Nuclear Disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament

Furthermore, India has signed a deal with Canada for the uranium supplies. A critical examination of the Indian nuclear program reveals that it has eight civilian reactors outside the IAEA safeguards; plutonium processed from the spent fuel of these reactors can be diverted to the weapon program.

As per the latest reports by the International Panel on the Fissile Material (IPFM), India has strategic reserves of 11 plus-minus 6 tons of the reactor grade plutonium as the strategic reserves. The international community must remain cognizant of the fact that any ounce of uranium imported into India will reduce the stress on its domestic reserves of fissile material, to be diverted for the weapon program eventually. 

After building huge reserves of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and plutonium, France, the UK, USA and Russia have observed unilateral moratoriums on fissile material production. The main problems in these unilateral moratoriums include lack of verification mechanisms, no legal value equivalent to an international treaty, and it does not address the issue of existing stockpiles. 

In 2015, Pakistan presented a working paper on the Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) in the Conference on Disarmament to highlight the salient features of its principled stance on the proposed treaty. Firstly, any measures aimed to achieve the agenda of disarmament must not by any means circumscribe the security of member states; any such treaty which aggravates the security concerns of states must not be negotiated at all.

Disarmament must be achieved at the lowest levels of armaments, while ensuring undiminished security for all. The proposed treaty must not be designed just to address non-proliferation, but as a mechanism to fulfill the disarmament obligations. Asymmetries in the fissile material stocks must be addressed at the regional and the global level, while including the existing stocks of fissile materials.

The existing stocks must be placed into three categories: fissile material in the deployed warheads, reserves of non-weaponized fissile material, and the fissile material from the retired warheads. The weaponized fissile material will not be covered under this treaty.

The strategic reserves of the non-weaponized fissile material produced under the unsafeguarded facilities or not designated for civilian or non-proscribed military uses must be reduced in a mutual and balanced manner, while acknowledging the asymmetries at the regional and global level.

The last category of fissile material from the retired nuclear warheads must be placed under the strict verification coverage of this treaty on the principle of irreversibility to obstruct its re-weaponization. Although this material may be used for civil or non-prescribed military use under the verification measures.                      

The proposed treaty must not develop a selective or a preferential criterion while differentiating between different nuclear weapon states, as well as between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states. Universal obligations must be developed for all states without defining any categories.

From a definitional standpoint, the treaty must adopt a holistic approach in covering various kinds of fissile materials that can be used in making nuclear weapons. Pakistan refers to Article 20 of the IAEA statute for defining the ‘special fissionable material’.

Read More: Reassessing the Conference on Disarmament: Deadlock, Hierarchy & Pathways for Reform

Pakistan’s position places a heavy premium on the verification mechanisms for this treaty, while proposing a representative and an independent treaty body for the above-said. The Fissile Material Treaty Organization (FMTO) as an executive body composed of all member states, will oversee the verification procedures. The IAEA, due to its internal differences, cannot perform this role.

The cases of non-compliance will be sent to the UNGA instead of the UNSC to ensure the consensus of all parties. A comprehensive approach must be pursued for the verification, while covering all kinds of facilities that cover the nuclear fuel cycle in its entirety, not just reprocessing and enrichment facilities. The proposed treaty must not by any means affect the inalienable right of state parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

A verification mechanism must strictly scrutinize any diversion of material from peaceful use to the weapons program. Pakistan reiterated that the Conference on the Disarmament (CD) remains the sole multi-lateral negotiating forum that works on a consensus-driven approach.

The proposed treaty must only be negotiated in the CD. Pakistan concluded that initiatives like UNGA Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) do not involve all the stakeholders; therefore, it does not endorse these platforms for negotiating the treaty, because it will lack ownership and legitimacy. 

Pakistan remains steadfast in joining the negotiations on the fissile material treaty, although under a new mandate that comprehensively accommodates the concerns and suggestions of all the member states. Pakistan cannot join the negotiations under the Shannon mandate, as its provisions will jeopardize national security and place Pakistan at a disadvantage vis-à-vis India.  

*The views presented in this article are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Diplomatic Insight.