Beyond Crisis Response: Can China and Pakistan Make Security Cooperation Routine?

Shehbaz Sharif and Xi Jinping shake hands in front of Chinese and Pakistani flags

On March 26, 2024, a suicide bomber struck a convoy near Besham in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, killing five Chinese engineers and their Pakistani driver. Seven months later, a bomb outside Karachi’s international airport killed two more Chinese workers.

Attacks like these, and the earlier ones at Dasu in 2021 and the University of Karachi in 2022, did more than test the two governments. They pulled the China-Pakistan security relationship onto ground that diplomats and generals had not traditionally covered: policing, prosecution, and the control of crime that crosses borders.

The joint statement of May 26, 2026, made that shift official. For the first time, the two sides pledged to “establish the China-Pakistan Security Partnership.” The phrase deserves a closer look. On paper, the two countries already have an extensive framework for law enforcement cooperation.

In practice, much of that cooperation has advanced in response to attacks rather than ahead of them, and the public record of joint operations is thin. Whether the new partnership amounts to more than a label will depend on whether it can turn crisis response into routine governance.

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For both countries, the most frequent threats to life and property now come from non-state actors and natural hazards rather than from foreign armies. China has written this into its security doctrine. The Holistic National Security Outlook, introduced in 2014, and Article 8 of the 2015 National Security Law require the state to coordinate “traditional and non-traditional security” as well as “China’s own security and common security.”

Under that framework, the safety of Chinese citizens and projects abroad counts as part of China’s own security, not merely a consular matter.

Pakistan’s pressures differ in origin but not in kind. Militant violence has hit Pakistani soldiers, police, and civilians far more often than foreigners, yet it keeps reaching Chinese personnel. The country sits on drug routes out of Afghanistan, and its financial system spent four years on the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

The two governments now speak much the same language about these threats. Their 2025–2029 Action Plan commits them to fight terrorism in all its forms with zero tolerance and to expand judicial and law enforcement cooperation.

The Legal Scaffolding Is Already There

The legal basis has been built over two decades. The Extradition Treaty (signed in 2003, in force since 2008) and the Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (signed in 2007, in force since 2010) provide the channels for surrendering fugitives and gathering evidence.

The 2005 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good-Neighborly Relations made cooperation against terrorism, organized crime, illegal immigration, and drug and arms trafficking a treaty obligation.

A companion agreement signed the same day allows China’s Ministry of Public Security and Pakistan’s Ministry of Interior to deal with each other directly on terrorism, separatism, and extremism. The 2013 boundary agreement commits both sides to joint action against cross-border crime.

Two further layers sit on top. Both countries are parties to the UN conventions against transnational organized crime and against corruption, which fill gaps the bilateral treaties leave open. And since Pakistan joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2017, both have worked within the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, a platform for intelligence exchange and joint exercises. Whatever holds cooperation back, it is not a shortage of law.

Counterterrorism: Progress Driven by Crisis

Counterterrorism is the most developed area of cooperation. It runs through direct contact between the two ministries under the 2005 agreement, through the foreign ministers’ strategic dialogue, and through regular ministerial meetings.

In January 2026, the seventh round of the strategic dialogue restated “zero tolerance” for terrorism, and Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong and Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi agreed to act against terrorism and online fraud and to do more to protect Chinese personnel, projects, and institutions.

The stakes are concentrated in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). By around May 2026, the corridor had drawn about $25.9 billion in direct investment. In 2020, China’s ambassador put the number of Chinese nationals in Pakistan at more than 23,000, most of them working on corridor projects, and Pakistan raised a dedicated Special Security Division to protect them.

The attacks at Dasu, Karachi University, Besham, and Karachi airport all struck Chinese personnel on the way to work or at work.

Yet the biggest upgrades have followed bloodshed. The Dasu bus bombing of July 2021 killed nine Chinese nationals and four Pakistanis; the April 2022 attack on the Confucius Institute at the University of Karachi killed three Chinese teachers and their Pakistani driver.

After Besham, the June 2024 joint statement recorded Pakistan’s commitment to strengthen security for Chinese personnel, projects, and institutions. Two weeks later, Pakistan’s apex committee on the National Action Plan approved Operation Azm-i-Istehkam, a day after a senior visiting Chinese official warned that insecurity was eroding investor confidence.

The October 2024 joint statement, issued nine days after the Karachi airport bombing, gave security cooperation a section of its own. The 2025–2029 Action Plan then called for every perpetrator of attacks on Chinese nationals to be caught and severely punished.

The operational side has grown as well. The SCO exercise Pabbi-Antiterror-2021, held in Pakistan, was the first time Chinese counterterrorism units deployed abroad with live weapons and ammunition. The system now responds to attacks quickly. What the public record does not yet show is a system that prevents them as reliably.

Crime, Money, and the Border

Drug control is the oldest strand of cooperation. A counter-narcotics memorandum dates back to 1996, and since 2018, liaison offices at Tashkurgan and Sust have linked officers on both sides of the frontier. The Taliban’s 2022 opium ban cut Afghan output by about 95 percent, from roughly 6,200 tons to 333 tons in a single year. Stockpiles remain, however, and synthetic drugs are a growing concern, so the channel is still needed.

Newer threats have produced commitments rather than operations. The Action Plan calls for exchanges between cyber and data security agencies, and Pakistan’s cabinet approved a cybersecurity memorandum with China’s national computer emergency response center in March 2025, although its signing has not been publicly confirmed.

Nothing resembling the large joint raids China has carried out against fraud compounds with Southeast Asian partners has been reported in Pakistan.

On financial crime, the reforms that took Pakistan off the FATF grey list in October 2022, after it completed 34 action items, also strengthened its Financial Monitoring Unit, giving Chinese investigators a more capable counterpart. Anti-corruption cooperation rests mainly on the UN convention.

Tellingly, the best-documented case ran from China to Pakistan: in 2021, Interpol’s bureau in China helped Pakistani police arrest a Pakistani fugitive wanted under a Red Notice.

The border, meanwhile, is getting busier. The Khunjerab Pass, the only land crossing between the two countries, has been open year-round since December 2024. The Action Plan calls for revising the Protocol on the Mechanism of Border Law Enforcement Cooperation to give border security a firmer legal footing.

Disaster response is where cooperation has moved fastest. After the 2005 earthquake, a Chinese rescue team was among the first international teams to reach Balakot.

During the 2022 floods, which affected about 33 million people and killed some 1,739, Chinese assistance in cash and kind reached RMB 660 million, with a further RMB 500 million pledged for reconstruction, according to China’s ambassador. In 2021, Pakistan received the first batch of COVID-19 vaccine aid that China gave to any foreign country.

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Three weaknesses stand out. Cooperation that is upgraded after each attack will always trail the threat. The public record is thin, with few documented joint operations and no flagship case in cybercrime or fugitive recovery; some confidentiality is unavoidable in police work, but opacity makes public confidence harder to build, especially in Pakistan, where the safety of Chinese nationals is closely watched. And several mechanisms remain unfinished, from the border protocol to the cybersecurity memorandum.

The new security partnership can address all three. The two sides should turn the Action Plan’s pledge to bring attackers to justice into regular case-level assistance and, over time, mutual recognition of evidence.

They should conclude the border protocol revision, sign and implement the cybersecurity memorandum, and pursue at least one concrete case of fugitive return and asset recovery under the UN convention. One successful case would count for more than another joint statement.

Because the threats are transnational, cooperation is not optional for either country. It is how each protects its people abroad, its borders, and its stability at home. The test of the next phase is whether that cooperation can move from crisis response to routine governance.

 

*The views presented in this article are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Diplomatic Insight.*

Dr. Chenrong Zheng
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Dr. Chenrong Zheng is head of the Department of Law in the School of Humanities and Law at Southwest Forestry University in Kunming, China. A longtime observer of non-traditional security in the region, Dr. Zheng studies how China and its neighbors cooperate against terrorism, transnational crime, and other cross-border threats.

Wei Zong

Wei Zong is a postdoctoral researcher at Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences, whose research mainly focuses on international relations in South Asia and China’s relations with South Asian countries.