The increasing reliance on minilateral security arrangements in the Indo-Pacific is neither a rejection of multilateralism, but a pragmatic response to the continued stagnation of multilateralism. In a region, characterized by the growing intensity of strategic competition, pending maritime disputes and increasing asymmetries of power, traditional multilateral mechanisms have found it hard to deliver timely and decisive results.
Against this backdrop, smaller, flexible groupings such as the Quad and AUKUS have been established as key pillars of the emerging Indo-Pacific security architecture. Their rise reflects a more general shift in the structure of state efforts to pursue security co-operation in an era less characterized by universal consensus and more by the selective alignment of states.
The Indo-Pacific today is the center of world geopolitical competition. It accounts for over 60 percent of the world’s economic productivity, hosts the busiest sea lines of communication in the world, and has several nuclear-armed states with unsettled territorial disputes.
Yet the institutional architecture of governance for this region still does not fit these realities. Multilateral forums built around an earlier era (often based on confidence building, dialogue and incrementalism) have struggled to cope with fast moving security problems. Consensus-based decision-making, while very appealing normatively, has often translated into paralysis.
This institutional inertia is most apparent in the security area. Despite decades of dialogue, conflicts in the South China Sea have yet to be resolved, military incidents are continuing to increase along the disputed borders, and coercive maritime practices continue to persist. The failure of the broad multilateral platforms to do anything meaningful to address these challenges has led to frustration on the part of states that face immediate security risks. As a result, many have turned towards smaller coalitions that promise speed, cohesion and operational relevance.
Minilateralism in this sense is best seen as an adaptive choice rather than an ideological choice. It is based on the acceptance that cooperation between a small group of like-minded states can achieve results that are difficult for larger groupings to attain. Unlike multilateral institutions focusing on inclusivity and process, minilateral arrangements focus on functionality and results. They enable states sharing similar perceptions of threat to coordinate their policies, pool their resources and signal resolution without the burden of representation of divergent interests.
The evolution of the Quad demonstrates this logic in a very clear way. Comprising the United States, Japan, India and Australia, the Quad brings together four maritime democracies with similar concerns about regional stability, freedom of navigation and the resilience of the rules governing the use of the global commons. While the Quad is frequently portrayed as a new alliance in the making, it is not so much formal commitments that matter to its significance, but rather practical cooperation.
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Its agenda ranges from maritime domain awareness, disaster response, infrastructure development, technology standards and supply chain resiliency. Collectively, Quad members account for a third of the world’s GDP and they have significant naval and air capabilities throughout the Indo-Pacific.
What makes the Quad stand out from traditional multilateral platforms is that it is able to transition from dialogue to delivery. Joint naval exercises, coordinated infrastructure finance and joint maritime surveillance efforts are expressions of a level of operational cooperation that is rarely attained in larger forums. This effectiveness is due to strategic convergence. Quad members do not agree on everything, but they do have enough common ground to be able to act collectively when they need to.
Critics often claim that minilateralism compromises the inclusivity of the region and runs the risk of fragmenting the security order. This is not an unfounded concern. Smaller groupings can have some perception of exclusion, especially for those states that value neutrality or fear entanglement in great-power competition. The alternative, however, of continuing with mechanisms that fail to deliver security, is not without its risks. Stagnation cultivates vulnerability and vulnerability encourages coercion.
ASEAN centered mechanisms illustrate this dilemma. ASEAN’s focus on consensus and non-interference has been a contributing factor to stability in the region in the past, but has also limited the ability of the group to respond collectively to assertive behavior. In critical situations, divisions between member states have undermined common stands, and this has affected the capacity of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to influence the outcome on issues directly bearing on regional security.
This does not diminish the diplomatic value of the Organization of Southeast Asian Nations or the tasks they have accomplished so far, but it does point to the limitations they have as a security provider in a more contested environment.
Minilateralism has come into existence specifically to fill these gaps. It enables the states to go for greater cooperation without quitting the wider regional cooperation. In reality, minilateral and multilateral approaches now coexist and build a layered security architecture rather than a choice between them. The challenge is to effectively manage this co-existence.
AUKUS is a more clear-cut embodiment of minilateral logic. By joining the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia into a long-term defense partnership, AUKUS is focused on high-end military capability and advanced technologies. Its most high-profile item – the decision to equip Australia with nuclear-powered submarines – indicates that there is a long-term commitment to influence the regional balance of power. Nuclear-powered submarines provide greater endurance, stealth and reach and deliver greater Australia’s ability to operate across the vast maritime spaces of the Indo-Pacific.
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The magnitude of this commitment is important. Estimates put the cost of Australia’s submarine program at well over A$300 billion over many decades, in addition to financial investment, but as a measure of strategic will. Beyond submarines, AUKUS involves cooperation in the areas of cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies and undersea systems. These are the areas at the heart of future warfare and it highlights that AUKUS is as much about technological competition as it is about deterrence.
Opposition to AUKUS has mainly focused on issues of escalation and nuclear proliferation. Critics report that bringing a nuclear propulsion technology into the region jeopardizes the non-proliferation norms and encourages counter balancing activities. These concerns should be carefully considered.
Yet they need to be balanced by the strategic context in which AUKUS was born. Rapid military modernization, increasing naval deployments, and the decline in the stability of deterrence have caused changes in the regional environment. In this environment, credible deterrence has become a priority for states that wish not to be coerced.
What tends to get lost in the discussions about AUKUS is its institutional logic. Rather than adding new multilateral organizations or growing existing alliances, AUKUS favors deep integration with a few partners. This depth makes interoperability and capability development at a level that it would be difficult to achieve in larger groupings. It reflects a recognition that the kind of advanced military cooperation that is required demands a measure of trust, shared standards and long-term alignment which is much more easily attained in minilateral settings.
The emergence of minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific is also part of wider changes in global governance. The post-Cold War optimism that security challenges could be dealt with by multilateral institutions through norms and dialogue has given way to a much more sober assessment of power politics. As strategic competition grows, states tend to prioritize arrangements that improve their ability to deter, defend and respond. Minilateralism provides a way of doing so without giving up diplomacy entirely.
Importantly, minilateralism does not necessarily involve the negation of multilateralism. In many instances, minilateral initiatives supplement wider ones by addressing specific problems to which multilateral bodies are unable to respond. For example, maritime domain awareness programs undertaken by smaller coalitions can provide feeding to regional platforms for enhanced collective situational awareness. Similarly, infrastructure activities planned across few states can serve as standards that would later serve as the basis for broader regional activities.
However, the success of minilateralism is dependent on how it is practiced. If minilateral groupings become rigid blocs based on being excluded, then they run the risk of being rigid divisions and making insecurity worse. If, instead, they are flexible, issue-based and transparent in nature, they can increase stability while coexisting with inclusive regional structures. The difference is in the intent and implementation.
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From my stance, the security architecture of the Indo-Pacific is going through a period of experimentation. States are experimenting with new types of cooperation to adapt to new realities. Minilateralism is one such experiment – born not of ideological preference, but out of necessity. It reflects the acknowledgement that the waiting for a consensus to be reached by dozens of actors is often incompatible with the rate of contemporary security problems.
This does not mean that multilateralism has failed, or should be abandoned. Multilateral institutions still fill critical roles in the norm-making, confidence-building and crisis-communication. They offer legitimacy and inclusivity that is impossible for minilateral groupings to achieve. The problem arises when multilateralism is adopted as sufficient as such, while there is clear evidence of its limitations.
The security of the Indo-Pacific would probably rest on the legitimacy of multilateralism intertwined with the effectiveness of minilateralism. This layered approach recognizes that there is not one framework that can solve all the problems. Broad forums can set out the principles and conduct diplomacy, and smaller coalitions can provide capabilities and operational response.
Ultimately, the question is not whether or not minilateralism is desirable, but rather if it is inevitable. Given the current course of competition in the region, the answer would seem obvious. States under immediate pressures for security will continue to look for arrangements that provide tangible security and strategic leverage to them. Minilateralism is one such avenue.
In assessing this trend, the need to overcome the notions of binary judgment that view minilateralism as either an actor of chaos or an actor of freedom from chaos is essential. It is neither. It is a tool – one that is influenced by context, interests and constraints. Used judiciously it can add strength to deterrence and resilience. Used recklessly it can increase bedrock and fuel mistrust.
In conclusion is that minilateralism has emerged as a strategic alternative to multilateral stagnation precisely as a reaction to the realities of power, the sense of urgency and alignment in the Indo-Pacific. It is a reflection of a world where states can no longer afford to rest upon slow moving institutions to protect their interests. The challenge ahead is not to reverse this trend, but to ensure that it adds to stability and not undermines it.
And in order to skirt the fate of the Indian Ocean, where unmanaged rivalries make it hard for the region’s countries to cooperate on its future, India and other Indo-Pacific nations must preserve some flexibility in their security architecture. Minilateralism committed to within a wider commitment to dialogue and restraint is one way to that end. The challenge facing policymakers is to find the right balance – using the power of small group cooperation without losing sight of the larger regional order that provides the basis for long-term peace.
*The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Diplomatic Insight.
Atiqullah Baig Mughul
Atiqullah Baig Mughul is a graduate in International Relations, specializing in security studies, Middle East politics, diplomacy, and policy-oriented geopolitical research. He can be reached at atiqullahmughal18@gmail.com
