Mediated by Qatar and Türkiye, the ceasefire reached in Doha between Pakistan and the de-facto authorities in Kabul, following a week of deadly cross-border clashes, is a much-needed and welcome reprieve. However, it needs to be viewed as a tactical pause that makes room for diplomacy rather than a long-term agreement. The ability of the Afghan government to take concrete, long-term action to prevent Afghan territory from serving as a base for violence and terrorism against Pakistan will ultimately determine its worth ahead.
Pakistan’s use of direct military force on Afghanistan represents a significant shift from decades of transit cooperation, refugee hosting, and diplomatic restraint. This move by Islamabad expresses dissatisfaction with the inability of Taliban government to destroy militant sanctuaries and respond to ongoing cross-border terrorism by organizations based in Afghanistan. Calls for verifiable action and a message that militant sanctuaries will no longer be tolerated, this use of force indicates a rebalanced security posture, even as Pakistan continues to support dialogue and regional stability.
Humanitarian commitments, geographical considerations, and economic interdependence have always influenced the strategy of Pakistan towards Afghanistan. The fact that Islamabad has been the primary transit route for a large portion of Afghanistan’s trade and has been the host to millions of Afghan refugees for decades has repeatedly required moderation, even during times of extreme bilateral strain. Pakistan still hosted more than a million officially registered Afghan refugees in 2024–2025 according to the UN and UNHCR. Many more rely on cross-border travel for family ties, trade, and remittances.
There have been numerous instances of militant activity coming from Afghanistan, especially attacks that have been attributed to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its affiliates. These attacks have resulted in massive internal displacement within Pakistan, as well as civilian casualties and military losses. Pakistan’s top-most grievance at every negotiation table is the continued presence of transnational militant infrastructure on Afghan soil. For a long time, analysts have cautioned that if the relationship of Taliban with extremist organizations is not handled, it increases the likelihood of transnational violence.
Due to long-standing organizational and historical ties; fighters, mutual aid, and overlapping networks created during years of insurgency, the Afghan Taliban are unable to break off their ties with the TTP. Combating Terrorism Centre at West Point Independent observers and UN reporting have revealed trends of material aid, shelter, and logistical support that keep TTP members operating in Afghanistan. Eventually, the loyalty of TTP to and support from elements in Afghanistan increases its operational reach and makes it a significant security threat to Pakistan even if it does not possess permanent territory inside Pakistan.
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The Doha ceasefire has immediate practical benefits, including a timetable for follow-up talks, a planned session in Istanbul, an agreed-upon cessation of kinetic exchanges, and a commitment by both sides to refrain from supporting groups that attack the other. These components establish a substantiate design and lessen the immediate threat of additional civilian casualties.
Nevertheless, there are actual systemic impediments to compliance. Deep-rooted suspicion exists between people, the border is permeable and frequently governed by local commanders and tribal authorities who do not always feel obligated to follow orders from the central government, and the Taliban government itself must contend with conflicting domestic priorities, such as internal security, legitimacy, and managing rival militias, which may limit its ability or willingness to impose strict regulations on any group operating inside Afghanistan. The ceasefire runs the risk of turning into yet another sporadic lull in the absence of strict oversight, convincing incentives, and enforceable penalties for violations.
The Taliban cannot realistically fight Pakistan for an extended period of time because of the stark asymmetry created by the conventional military superiority of Islamabad and deterrent capabilities, which make interstate conflict expensive, impossible for Kabul to win, and only offering modest strategic advantage. Legitimation at home is equally crucial: Afghans are unlikely to support the Taliban in a campaign against Pakistan. Afghans, who traditionally organized against foreign occupiers, now place a higher priority on security, stability, and basic livelihoods than on resuming cross-border adventure after decades of conflict. Humanitarian and rights reports reveal a population worn down by violence and more concerned with surviving than with confronting the outside world.
The responsibilities of Kabul are, understandably, the prime political focus of the cease fire. Permissiveness cannot be protected by sovereignty. The Taliban leadership must demonstrate, in a clear and visible manner, that it will not provide sanctuary to groups that attack Pakistan if it hopes to achieve normalization, diplomatic space, and the resumption of trade and transit. In retrospect, such measures to violate the Doha Agreement and jeopardize the agreements that made the U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan possible. That calls for more than just declarations; it calls for the destruction of militant logistics and safe havens, the arrest and prosecution of those responsible, strong intelligence cooperation, and open public reporting of all actions. The skepticism of Pakistan is completely justified in the absence of such tangible steps.
Islamabad must, however, transform its tactical advantage into institutional frameworks that lessen the motivation for reactionary measures. Repeated cross-border attacks and retaliation lead to vicious cycles of violence that injure civilians, obstruct trade routes such as Torkham and Chaman, and exacerbate the very instability that both governments say they wish to eradicate. Therefore, the international community, in particular third-party mediators like Qatar and Turkey, must be given the authority to supervise validation and assist in creating legitimate non-military incentives for compliance.
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The regional context has acquired a new and sensitive dimension: The recent diplomatic engagement of New Delhi with the Taliban. After a prolonged period of limited contact following the Taliban takeover in 2021, India announced plans in October 2025 to reopen its embassy in Kabul and to upgrade practical ties, a pragmatic recalibration widely reported in international media. New Delhi has framed its outreach as narrowly transactional, consular, humanitarian and trade-related, and has not formally recognized the Taliban government, nevertheless, the diplomatic thaw is plainly consequential for regional alignments.
This change has been viewed by Islamabad from a security perspective. Islamabad has officially expressed concerns following the visit of Afghan delegations to New Delhi and the joint India-Afghanistan statements. Pakistani officials have publicly warned that anti-Pakistan elements could use any closer India-Taliban network to operate against Pakistani interests from Afghan soil. Senior military officials and the foreign ministry of Pakistan have made those charges directly, and regional media outlets have covered them.
These are serious accusations that, if proven true, would turn diplomatic engagement into a means of destabilization through proxies, however, they are still accusations that need clear proof and international investigation. They should be reported and handled as the expressed concerns of Islamabad for the time being rather than as an unquestionable fact.
The claim of Pakistan that Afghanistan cannot win a direct military conflict is a sober assessment of interests and capabilities rather than a show of audacity. Pakistan has a sizable, well-trained professional armed forces with strategic deterrents, while the Taliban-led Afghan forces lack the conventional capability, airpower, and support necessary for prolonged state-on-state conflict. No party, not even Pakistan, wants to incur the devastating humanitarian, economic, and diplomatic costs of an open interstate conflict. The disparity in equipment, force composition, and maintenance between Pakistani and Taliban-led Afghan forces is highlighted by recent comparative analyses.
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The position of Taliban of bearing or failing to dismantle groups that attack Pakistan has obvious strategic costs. Frequent allegations of sanctuary raise diplomatic distance from neighboring states and jeopardize transit and trade routes. Others use this laxity as an excuse to take punitive measures that fall short of going to war, such as tighter border controls, targeted attacks, and economic restrictions. The political and security costs of Kabul are increased by these coercive measures. To put it briefly, permitting militant activity to persist will make it much more difficult for the Taliban and regular Afghans to govern, rebuild, and return to normalcy.
The time that the Doha ceasefire earns must be used to establish confirmation institutions, turn assurances into arrest warrants and, when evidence allows, prosecutions, and re-establish Afghanistan-Pakistan ties based on shared interests rather than suspicions. Because repeated exposure to cross-border attacks has a cumulative political and strategic cost, the patience of Pakistan is limited. However, building institutions supported by reliable verification and concrete incentives is the solution rather than using an unrestricted force.
The diplomatic environment is made more difficult by regional realignments, such as the recent outreach of New Delhi to Kabul. Islamabad has right to be concerned that foreign involvement could be used against its security, and this should be addressed through open, multilateral procedures rather than implication. As Islamabad has stated, claims that India is ‘using Afghan soil’ against Pakistan should be looked into and decided within the framework of verification that the ceasefire is supposed to establish.
The ceasefire must produce measurable outcomes: a demonstrable end to sanctuary for groups that attack Pakistan, secure reopening of trade and migration channels, and an independent mechanism to hold violators to account. Anything less will be a postponement of violence, not a pathway to stable, mutually beneficial relations.
*The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of TDI.
Abdul Haq
Abdul Haq holds an MS degree in International Relations from the School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA), Jilin University, the People’s Republic of China. He writes on global issues, international politics, international law, peace, conflict, and security. He currently works as a research assistant in CCTVES, the Institute of Regional Studies (IRS), Islamabad, Pakistan. He can be reached at ahsafi.edu@gmail.com
