Pakistan has traditionally advocated for the Palestinian cause, but the most recent Israel-Gaza conflict (October 2023-2025) has cast a fresh light on its foreign policy. As Islamabad grapples with the fallout from Hamas’ strikes and Israel’s furious reprisal, it must balance profound popular support for Palestinians with changing regional ties. The October attacks on Hamas leaders in Qatar triggered an unusually vigorous Pakistani reaction, including trips to Doha, appeals for UN action, and a new Saudi military deal, despite local opposition.
Pakistan is staunchly committed to Palestine, both officially and publicly. Its Ministry of Foreign Affairs reaffirmed “Pakistan does not recognize Israel, has no diplomatic or military engagement with it, and maintains a clear, principled stance in support of Palestinian self-determination.” Pakistani passports even prohibit travel to Israel, serving as a symbolic reminder of the policy. In reaction to the Gaza war, Islamabad used diplomatic channels: it summoned an emergency UN Security Council session, held an Arab-Islamic meeting in Doha, and led an OIC delegation that condemned campaign. Pakistani media and officials have used harsh rhetoric to describe Israel’s actions as a genocide.
Pakistan led a (non-binding) UN Human Rights Council resolution in April 2024 calling for an end to military supplies to Israel. These efforts are consistent with popular mood; opinion surveys indicate that Pakistanis are overwhelmingly supportive of Gaza and outraged by civilian losses. Nevertheless, Pakistan has refrained from providing direct military assistance to Palestinians. This is partially due to realism. It has provided humanitarian help and expressed sympathy but no soldiers or weapons have been sent. Indeed, the concept of deploying troops to join a multinational Gaza stability force is divisive. Analysts warn that collaborating with Israeli soldiers will “ignite domestic backlash” and weaken the country’s “diplomatic posture.” In sum, Pakistan’s traditional posture on Palestine remains unchanged; officials speak out strongly against Israeli activities while carefully avoiding overtures to Israel.
In addition to moral support, Pakistan is strengthening its Gulf strategic alliances. Islamabad and Riyadh inked a Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement in September, paving the way for a close-security alliance. Under this treaty, any attack on one nation is considered aggression against both. Pakistan is the world’s only nuclear-armed Muslim-majority country, and Saudi Arabia has traditionally depended on Pakistani training and experience (an estimated 1,500-2,000 Pakistani personnel have served in the kingdom). In response, Saudi Arabia has offered critical financial assistance to Pakistan’s economy, including a $3 billion loan due in late 2025. This stronger defense relationship attempts to prevent regional threats; Riyadh’s officials have said that it is not geared at any single nation, but rather reflects “long-standing and deep cooperation”.
The treaty reinforces Pakistan’s status as a Gulf security partner and offers additional channels for military and financial support during a crisis. Pakistan’s burgeoning ties with Saudi Arabia come at a time when Gulf dynamics are shifting. Riyadh and Tehran were formerly at enmity, even fighting via proxy wars. They have now normalized relations (a milestone facilitated by China in 2023), which Islamabad has officially welcomed. Pakistan’s foreign ministry hailed the Saudi-Iran reunion as a show of Muslim unity and lauded China for its role in the process. Iran’s security leader echoed similar tone, saying he was “pleased” with the Saudi-Pak alliance and called for wider Islamic brotherhood.
This underscores Pakistan’s need to strike a balance with two close neighbors: Iran has a 560-mile boundary and a common interest in reducing cross-border violence on its western border, while Pakistan’s future is economically linked to the Gulf to the south. Islamabad has tried to assuage Tehran’s concerns; despite sectarian divides, Pakistan welcomed Iranian President Raisi in 2024 and avoided taking sides in Syria or Yemen. Strategic diplomacy now requires Pakistan to persuade Iran that the Saudi alliance is only defensive, even as it strengthens military relations with Riyadh. To summarize, Pakistan must walk a tight line between consolidating its Gulf relationship and alienating Iran, and vice versa.
Global power divides have muddled Pakistan’s stance even more. The old US-led system is disintegrating, and a multipolar period is unfolding, with China, India, and other nations on the rise. Pakistan has relied largely on Chinese assistance (infrastructure investment, diplomatic cover), while carefully hedging against an untrustworthy US. Chinese diplomacy has stood out in the Middle East as Beijing arranged the Saudi-Iran cease-fire and has taken a more impartial posture on the Gaza conflict than Washington. Pakistani strategists must thus take into account Beijing’s strategy. At the same time, Washington remains important: US involvement in the Gulf region sometimes includes Pakistan.
Importantly, scholars warn against openly supporting American or Israeli actions without respect for Pakistan’s interests. If Islamabad gets too cozy with US initiatives, such as accepting the Abraham Accords or hosting a US base in Balochistan, it might create domestic reaction and “push Iran away,” thereby supporting US interests of restraining China in the Arabian Sea. This highlights Pakistan’s predicament: US overtures must be limited so that they do not offend its ideological base or primary partner, China. It also implies that Pakistan should calibrate any military cooperation (such as a Gaza mission) to avoid being seen as merely carrying out US-Arab goals.
The larger normalization drive, in which some Arab states have recently (or will soon) recognize Israel, also puts Pakistan’s stance to the test. Islamabad has said little about Israel-Arab talks, but its position is clear: normalization necessitates justice for Palestinians. Indeed, top Saudi officials have publicly linked any recognition of Israel to a realistic path to a two-state solution. This matches Pakistan’s own red line. In practice, Islamabad should stick to that conditional stance. If Saudi Arabia normalizes, Pakistan could frame any potential policy change as contingent on Palestinian gains, thus remaining true to its principles. For the time being, Pakistan can take pride in the fact that its key Gulf partner (and others, such as the UAE) expresses the same reservations about Palestine as it does.
Pakistan’s leadership must articulate a dual-track strategy: continue to advocate for Palestinian rights in rhetoric and diplomacy while avoiding actions that could undermine Pakistan’s own security and society. Policymakers might think about measures like reiterating Pakistan’s support for Palestinian self-determination publicly (in line with the FO statement), and continue to press for an immediate ceasefire and humanitarian access in Gaza, supporting efforts (through the UN or the OIC) that do not jeopardize Pakistan’s no-recognition policy, considering donating to Gaza relief efforts (medical teams, aid logistics) and joining any UN-led stabilization mission only if the mandate clearly respects Pakistan’s red lines. Pakistan’s strong peacekeeping record could be highlighted, but any troop deployment should be transparently decided in parliament to avoid public suspicion.
Pakistan must take advantage of the Saudi defense pact to increase economic support and security cooperation, negotiate preferential labor opportunities or investments in exchange for military contributions, for instance, make sure the partnership is defensive: emphasize that “aggression on one is aggression on both,” and that Pakistan’s involvement is aimed at regional stability rather than confrontation, maintain high-level talks with Tehran, building on China’s successful brokering, assure Iran that the Saudi-Pakistani alliance has no intention of targeting Shia interests. Islamabad’s official reception of Riyadh-Tehran ties has been a positive start. To demonstrate impartiality, Pakistan could also support regional dialogues (such as Yemen ceasefire talks) and UN arms control resolutions.
Pakistan can also seek Chinese support for Pakistani initiatives (such as mediation or UN peacekeeping), while remaining open to US engagement that aligns with Pakistan’s interests (counterterrorism, economic aid) without forcing Pakistan to implement unpopular policies. As analysts advise, make sure that any security decisions reflect national consensus in all dealings. As the Middle East realigns, Pakistan should position itself as a moderate voice, advocating for a two-state solution between Israel and Palestine, rather than aligning with any one camp. Normalization should be preceded by Palestinian statehood, according to Islamabad’s bipartisan consensus. Maintaining this stance will help Pakistan retain its credibility both at home and abroad.
Pakistan’s current foreign policy test is essentially a moral-strategic one. It cannot abandon its decades-long solidarity with Palestinians without risking domestic outrage and regional isolation. However, it cannot ignore its own economic problems and security risks. As a result, Islamabad must tread carefully: it can speak out strongly for justice in Gaza while quietly maintaining open lines of communication with both Riyadh and Tehran. As a result, Pakistan can emerge from the Middle East upheaval as a principled actor and dependable partner, preserving its values without jeopardizing its interests.
*The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own and do not represent TDI. The contributor is responsible for the originality of this piece.
Hamdan Ahmed
Hamdan Ahmed is a student of International Relations at NUML, Islamabad. He can be reached at hamdanahmed319@gmail.com
