In April 2025, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) – an ethnic Kokang armed group – quietly withdrew from Lashio, the largest city in northern Shan State, Myanmar, just months after seizing it from junta control. This retreat, compelled by intense Chinese pressure and mediation, marked a stunning reversal of fortunes for Myanmar’s anti-military junta resistance.
Only eight months earlier, in August 2024, MNDAA fighters and allied resistance forces (including People’s Defense Forces loyal to the National Unity Government, or NUG) had liberated Lashio after a month-long offensive. That victory was heralded as part of “Operation 1027,” a coordinated multi-front offensive launched in late 2023 by ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) that wrested most of northern Shan State – and vital border trade routes – from junta hands.
However, what followed in Lashio’s case was not consolidation but capitulation under external influence.
China’s behind-the-scenes intervention to facilitate and pressure the handover of Lashio back to Myanmar’s military has exposed a critical weakness in the NUG’s strategy and the broader resistance movement. This episode underscores a significant foreign policy failure for the NUG and its allies, who have struggled to forge a coordinated national mechanism with EAOs for governing liberated areas.
It also spotlights how the NUG’s overreliance on Western support, at the expense of cultivating a trust-based relationship with its powerful neighbor, China, has undermined the revolutionary cause.
Operation 1027 and the Fall of Lashio
Lashio’s capture was a watershed moment in Myanmar’s civil resistance. As part of Operation 1027 (named after its launch in late October 2023), the Three Brotherhood Alliance – comprising the MNDAA, Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and Arakan Army (AA) – opened a new front against the junta in northern Shan State.
By early August 2024, their fighters (coordinating with local PDFs under the NUG’s umbrella) had overrun Lashio and even the Myanmar military’s Northeastern Regional Command headquarters. The fall of Lashio, the de facto capital of northern Shan, marked an unprecedented rebel advance into a major population center.
It also severed key roads and trade routes to China, dealing a strategic blow to the junta’s logistics. For the resistance coalition, Lashio’s liberation was a tangible if hard-fought victory.
However, this success carried the seeds of new challenges. Lashio lies just a few hours’ drive from the China border and sits along the critical Muse–Lashio trade corridor, making its status a matter of keen interest to Beijing. Indeed, Beijing’s initial tacit tolerance for Operation 1027 quickly turned to alarm once Lashio fell, which Chinese officials viewed as a “red line” breach of their interests.
The alliance’s campaigns earlier in 2023 had aligned with some Chinese objectives – for instance, shutting down border cyber scam hubs that victimized Chinese citizens – but the seizure of a major city like Lashio went “too far” in Beijing’s eyes. It threatened to further destabilize the border and, crucially, signaled that China’s alleged EAO proxies were acting beyond Beijing’s control.
What ensued was a decisive Chinese intervention that would reverse many of the resistance’s gains in the north.
Beijing’s Mediation and Pressure Campaign
China swiftly moved to restore what it saw as order along its Yunnan frontier. Within weeks of Lashio’s capture, Beijing began exerting heavy pressure on the MNDAA and its allies to halt their offensive and refrain from pushing further into central Myanmar.
In September 2024 – barely a month after Lashio’s fall – the MNDAA issued a Chinese-language public statement denouncing any cooperation with the NUG and pledging not to advance on more cities, a clear concession to Chinese demands. (Notably, this statement was posted online and then quickly taken down.)
Beijing also shuttered several border crossings and blocked vital trade and supply routes into areas held by the northern EAOs. According to some reports, China even conducted live-fire military drills near the border as a warning signal.
China’s Special Envoy for Asian Affairs, Deng Xijun, took a direct role. Deng engaged not only with the MNDAA but also with the powerful United Wa State Army (UWSA), reportedly warning the UWSA to cut off military support to the Brotherhood Alliance and asserting that Beijing would not recognize the MNDAA’s occupation of Lashio.
In an extraordinary move, MNDAA’s ageing commander Peng Daxun was allegedly forced to stay in China in late October 2024 under the pretext of “medical treatment” to pressure the Kokang fighters into withdrawing.
By early 2025, China shifted from coercion to mediation. In March 2025, Chinese-brokered talks between the MNDAA and the junta were convened in Kunming. Though no peace deal was finalized, arrangements were made under China’s auspices. Beijing “invited” both sides to accept Chinese ceasefire monitors and a handover arrangement.
On April 21, MNDAA forces pulled out, and junta troops returned to Lashio under Chinese supervision. China’s Foreign Ministry claimed that both parties “commended China’s constructive role.” For Beijing, the operation restored the status quo; for the revolution, it was a hard lesson in diplomatic vulnerability.
A Coalition Divided: Failure to Consolidate a Unified Front
The Lashio episode laid bare the NUG and resistance coalition’s inability to govern liberated areas collaboratively. Although PDFs loyal to the NUG had helped seize the city, it was administered exclusively by the MNDAA through a local “Lashio Reconstruction Committee.”
The NUG’s civil authorities played a little visible role. The MNDAA even installed its own police and administrative offices, treating Lashio as Kokang territory. This fragmentation allowed China to negotiate solely with the MNDAA, bypassing the broader resistance.
While the idea of joint governance structures between the NUG and EROs may seem idealistic, it’s important to acknowledge the realities on the ground. Ethnic armed organizations like the MNDAA have long prioritized autonomy and are often reluctant to share administrative control, especially in strategically vital areas like Lashio.
Given the absence of mutual trust and the lack of clear chains of command, imposing shared responsibility in Lashio might have led to confusion or even worsened intra-resistance tensions.
That said, the problem was not merely one of capacity or timing, but of the absence of even a minimal coordinating mechanism. Without any unified front, China was able to isolate the MNDAA and negotiate bilaterally. Even a loose federal wartime coordination council—a short-term, flexible body involving trusted representatives from the NUG and allied EAOs—could have aligned messaging, shared responsibilities, and complicated unilateral decisions.
Existing frameworks like the Federal Democracy Charter and the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) are essential for long-term nation-building. But they are deliberative and not built for the immediate operational realities of conflict zones.
The resistance needs an agile, temporary governance mechanism capable of real-time decision-making and joint negotiations. Without this, victories like Lashio will remain vulnerable to both external coercion and internal fragmentation.
Overlooking the Neighbor: NUG’s Western Tilt and China’s Backlash
Since its formation after the 2021 coup, the NUG has focused heavily on building ties with the West. It opened offices in Washington and other capitals, advocated for sanctions, and gained symbolic backing from democratic governments.
While this bolstered its international profile, it also confirmed China’s fears that the NUG was aligned with Western interests. Beijing perceived the revolution not just as domestic turmoil, but as a geopolitical intrusion.
As a result, China decisively tilted toward the junta. It invited the military leadership to high-profile summits and supported their planned elections. Chinese state media dismissed the NUG’s legitimacy, despite its public affirmations of the One China Policy and pledges to safeguard Chinese investments.
Beijing seem to have concluded that a federal democracy next door is a destabilizing risk, one that might encourage similar sentiments at home or invite foreign involvement.
Notably, the United States and Europe offered only limited practical support. Few Sanctions and statements failed to deter junta airstrikes or prevent the Lashio handover. Western moral support has proven no substitute for tangible influence.
In contrast, China’s diplomatic leverage dictated real outcomes on the ground. The Lashio case demonstrates how overreliance on the West, without engaging effectively with the regional power next door, leaves the NUG exposed.
Rebalancing with Realism: Toward a Geopolitically Savvy Approach
Skeptics may rightly point out that China has historically supported state actors and shown little interest in revolutionary or democratic movements. This is a valid concern. However, the strategic goal for the NUG is not to win China’s endorsement, but to secure non-obstruction and predictable engagement. Even if ideological alignment is unlikely, practical cooperation is not impossible.
China has engaged pragmatically with non-state actors where its interests, such as border security, are involved. The Taliban in Afghanistan, or armed groups in Sudan and South Sudan, illustrate Beijing’s flexibility when needed. Reframing NUG’s China strategy this way can clarify expectations. The task is not to court friendship, but to reduce perceived threats and prevent unilateral interventions.
To that end, the NUG should:
- Establish formal and backchannel communication with China using ethnic intermediaries, business networks, or third-party states.
- Reaffirm its pledges on Chinese interests—non-alignment, investment security, and cross-border cooperation—and consistently amplify them.
- Prevent resistance-linked forces from attacking Chinese infrastructure and signal readiness to protect Chinese projects in controlled areas.
- Create a short-term joint administrative body with EAOs to avoid unilateral withdrawals and present a unified front in any future negotiations.
- Maintain Western support quietly, avoiding excessive fanfare that fuels China’s suspicions of encirclement or ideological confrontation.
This approach, inspired by realist thinkers like Kishore Mahbubani, seeks to balance revolutionary ideals with strategic autonomy.
Lessons from Lashio for Myanmar’s Future
The quiet exit from Lashio was not a battlefield loss—it was a diplomatic and organizational failure. To prevent future setbacks, Myanmar’s resistance must treat China not as a distant monolith but as a proximate, powerful stakeholder.
It must also strengthen internal unity through shared administrative frameworks that can resist external manipulation.
The Lashio moment encapsulates a crossroads: between fragmented resistance and coordinated revolution, between distant support and proximate engagement. If the NUG can recalibrate—building alliances at home and strategic bridges abroad—it may yet turn battlefield victories into enduring political gains.
Because in the end, winning Myanmar’s future will require more than courage on the frontlines. It will require diplomacy in boardrooms—and a readiness to win not just wars, but the balance of interests.
*The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of TDI.
Harry Myo Lin
Harry Myo Lin is a Myanmar-born peacebuilder, political analyst, and writer currently based in Vienna, Austria. Recognized by Time Magazine in 2019 as one of the “Young Leaders Shaping the Decade,” he has worked extensively on interfaith dialogue, human rights, and conflict transformation across Asia. He currently consults with international organizations and writes on diplomacy, governance, and Southeast Asian affairs.
