The Silent Rise of Data Colonialism in South Asia

Digital technology is now deeply embedded in daily life across most developing countries. Whether people are using mobile banking, online shopping, navigation tools or social media, their personal information is constantly being logged by the platforms they interact with. While this creates convenience and modern efficiency, it has quietly opened the door to a new form of structural dependence.

This emerging dynamic is often described as “Data Colonialism”, a system in which powerful external companies control the collection, storage and use of data generated within weaker states, leaving those states with little ownership or supervision.

At the core of this concern lies a compact but dominant set of technological giants. Platforms operated by Google, Meta, TikTok and cloud networks like Amazon Web Services (AWS) posses some of the world’s most far-reaching data reservoirs. These systems continuously examine a wide spectrum of user behavior including browsing patterns, modes of communication, location and purchasing preferences.

A 2024 investigative report revealed that Google had gathered extraordinarily sensitive details such as children’s voice samples, home address information and vehicle license identifiers, through simple uploads, demonstrating how routine digital interactions can inadvertently reveal personal data. In a comparable manner, Meta’s association with the Cambridge Analytica scandal showed that personal information was extracted and exploited to influence political behavior. These events demonstrate that once data enters such ecosystems, it can be repurposed for objectives far beyond the purpose for which individuals originally submitted it.

Countries rely heavily on external cloud storage companies which create a layer of dependency. AWS and Microsoft Azure store data for governments, banks, telecom companies and even security institutions in many developing states. When a nation depends on external storage networks for its central data infrastructure, it loses self-governance and full autonomy over decisions involving security and access.

This risk became evident in India when a developer alleged that AWS had mishandled crucial financial records, leading to serious losses and raising concerns about the overall integrity of data kept outside domestic authority. Situations like these reveals how easily digital systems can become unstable when critical information resides beyond a country’s own jurisdiction.

Another well-known instance of foreign digital influence in India emerged when Meta tried to launch Free Basics, a service designed to provide a selective form of internet connectivity free of charge. Although it appeared to support digital access, Indian experts argued that it created an imbalanced online environment by allowing only certain websites approved by Meta to be accessed without data charges.

This arrangement would have given the company an unusual degree of oversight over what information millions of users could see. In 2016, Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) officially banned Free Basics for violating net-neutrality rules, stating that internet service providers cannot offer “discriminatory tariffs” based on content type. The regulator viewed the service as a threat to open access and local competition. Moreover, Free Basics would have allowed Meta to guide online behavior and gather valuable user data by limiting what counted as “Free Internet.” This episode shows how a foreign platform could shape a developing country’s digital space while benefiting from large-scale data accumulation in the process.

Compared to India, where Free Basics was formally banned, the service was actually launched in Pakistan in 2015 through a partnership between Facebook and the mobile operator Zong. Unlike India, Pakistan did not prohibit the service and the technical framework remains accessible for Pakistani users. However, its present-day usage level is unclear as no recent regulatory updates or telecom statements explain how actively it is being promoted or how much data it continues to collect.

This pattern indicates a broader structural concern; foreign digital services can remain deeply embedded in national digital ecosystems for years without transparent monitoring or meaningful public awareness regarding how personal data is controlled and utilized.

In Pakistan, this vulnerability is heightened by the absence of effective legal protections. Although various drafts of a Personal Data Protection Bill have been formulated, the law has not yet been fully implemented. Consequently, citizens lack defined rights over the ways their data is collected, stored or transferred. In the absence of binding rules, state bodies and private platforms may act in ways that threaten individual privacy or expose personal information. Simultaneously, the rapid expansion of online banking, surveillance networks and digital public services has not been matched with equivalent legal guarantees, leaving a wide gap between technological advancement and user protection.

A second area of concern involves surveillance systems. Pakistan has imported advanced monitoring technologies from foreign suppliers which enable large-scale phone tapping and internet filtering. Amnesty International’s findings raised questions about whether this technology is being used with proper accountability and whether the data collected stays within Pakistan’s control. The use of external companies’ technologies in building surveillance infrastructure introduces serious ambiguity regarding who ultimately exercises command over the information that is gathered.

This condition explains why the concept of Data Colonialism has gained relevance. It reflects a structure in which developing nations generate large-scale quantities of data, yet the control to store, examine and monetize that data rests outside their borders. In the same way that earlier colonial systems removed physical resources, this new digital form extracts information, now the most valuable resource of the modern era.

To address this, Pakistan must adopt a multi-layered approach. The first step is passing a strong, enforceable, data protection law that clearly defines citizens’ rights and restricts both government and corporate misuse. The establishment of transparency in surveillance technologies along with independent oversight institutions, local data centers and advanced cybersecurity expertise is essential to minimize overdependence on foreign providers.

In the absence of its own digital infrastructure and technical capacity, Pakistan will remain tied to systems it does not fully govern. Data Colonialism does not advance through aggression or clear confrontation; rather it progresses quietly through everyday digital behavior, trusted platforms and commonly used services. Its impact is lasting, shaping the balance of power in the digital era. Unless Pakistan and similar countries take deliberate action, they may gradually surrender their digital sovereignty to foreign forces. The direction of a nation’s security, economy and civil life is now closely linked to how it manages authority over its data.

*The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Diplomatic Insight.