For more than seven decades, nuclear deterrence has been considered a key principle of global security, based on the belief that the fear of mutually assured destruction prevents states from carrying all-out war. In South Asia, the apparent nuclearization of India and Pakistan in 1998 was expected to lock both rivals into a state of “cautious stability”.
Verily, the weapons have arguably prevented the outbreak of major wars, but the past two decades have showed us that nuclear deterrence has not removed the risk of conflict, it has only reshaped it.
Recent India-Pakistan crises, including Balakot in 2019 and the more recent clashes in 2025, demonstrate that deterrence today is weak, vulnerable to miscalculation, and progressively hard to maintain in an unpredictable regional environment.
A Fragile Balance: Lessons from South Asia
The first test came with the Kargil War of 1999, almost after one year when both countries declared themselves as nuclear powers. Despite severe hostilities, neither side crossed specific thresholds, certainly aware that escalation could lead towards catastrophic retaliation. This act seemed to validate deterrence theory, but it also showed its limits as nuclear weapons only constrained the scope of the war and could not fully prevent conflict.
The 2019 Pulwama-Balakot crisis showed how fast things can get out of the hands in south Asia. After the Pulwama attack, India hit back with airstrikes in Pakistan. Pakistan’s military responded quickly. When Pakistan caught an Indian pilot, tensions between the two became extremely intense. Restraint between the nuclear-armed states doesn’t eliminate the risk of military actions going haywire.
In May 2025, India’s Operation Sindoor airstrikes targeting Pakistani sites provoked a forceful reaction from Pakistan, intensifying tensions in the region. The crisis highlighted that nuclear deterrence wasn’t enough to prevent conflict; instead, it led to cautious manoevring by both sides. A mix of diplomacy, international pressure, and clear communication channels helped keep the crisis under control.
Nuclear arms create contradiction: they prevent major wars but give rise to smaller, more confined conflicts.
This “stability–instability paradox” means that states may feel emboldened to take risks below the nuclear threshold, precisely because they assume their adversary will avoid escalation. In South Asia, that paradox has produced more frequent crises, not fewer.
Deterrence Under Strain in the 21st Century
Three trends make nuclear deterrence less reliable today.
First, multidomain conflicts complicate signaling. Modern crises now include cyber operations, disinformation campaigns, and strikes against dual-use targets. A cyberattack that hit communication systems or an airstrike near sensitive installations could simply be misinterpreted by the leaders as preparation for a nuclear strike from the rival state, this could lead to dangerous decisions.
Second, internal political pressures can fuel a cycle of exacerbation. In the midst of crisis, hasty responses can lead to severe consequences. This mostly happens due to the public pressure and media attention. Thereby, situation gets worse and governments could lead down a confrontational path, despite the involved risks. Nuclear deterrence, rather than avoiding tensions, can amplify the crisis dynamics.
Read More: Redefining the Security Paradigm and Deterrence in South Asia
The lack of robust crisis management mechanisms is notable. Communication between these two countries is alarmingly limited. With minimal military talks and infrequently utilized direct lines, misinterpretations can quickly escalate into unmanageable situations. With timeframes for decision making being incredibly short, leaders might be forced towards impulsive decisions, weighing the risk of striking first against potential catastrophe.
These weaknesses assert that nuclear deterrence, itself, is not a strong security tool, rather it is a weak framework that can hold only if supported by caution, institutions, and communication.
Beyond Deterrence: The Need for Crisis Management and Way Forward
South Asia’s 20-year nuclear experience reveals that relying on deterrence has its limits in maintaining lasting peace.
A strong defense is just one piece of the puzzle. A comprehensive strategy that combines defense with collaboration can have a positive impact for the region.
Key elements include direct talks, transparency in military operations, and enhanced security measures for sensitive facilities. Additionally, practical steps like joint air traffic management and intelligence sharing can create a lasting impact.
Diplomatic engagement on a global scale helps mitigate conflicts. Past experiences have proven that strategic communication, backed by determination, has a proven track record of effectively calming explosive situations. While the two states are sensitive about international involvements, this could definitely prevent a catastrophic outcome.
While nuclear deterrence is not entirely ineffective, it is also not foolproof. It creates a wall against total war but do little to prevent dangerous clashes at lower levels. The contemporary security environment demands a multidimensional approach to deterrence, incorporating robust crisis management, transparent strategic doctrines, and judicious political decision-making. The absence of these components can provide weak nuclear balance in South Asia and vulnerability to destabilization.
*The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of TDI.
Sadia Sohail
Sadia Sohail is an MPhil student of Strategic Studies at National Defense University (NDU), Islamabad, with a bachelor's in International Relations from NUML. She can be reached at sadiasohail010622@gmail.com
