The United States today finds itself in a historic standoff not only with one major rival, but with two, China and Russia, who are increasingly working in concert. As the Beijing-Moscow partnership has evolved from a loose to robust alliance, against U.S.’s interests, a critical question emerges as to whether Washington’s own approach inadvertently fueled in this strengthened partnership?
A relationship of unequals, now a partnership of necessity
China and Russia might not seem like natural friends, but they are teaming up to counterbalance U.S. power. Their partnership is based on mutual interests rather than shared ideals.
Western sanctions have pushed Russia to seek new alliances, while China’s struggle against US dominance has made it a willing partner.
Together, they’re finding ways to work around the challenges thrown their way. What was once a partnership of convenience is now increasingly a strategic alignment.
Containment on two fronts
Washington’s foreign policy toward both China and Russia has been built on a logic of containment. In Europe, NATO has expanded eastward, incorporating countries once within Moscow’s sphere of influence. Russia perceives this as encirclement.
In Asia, the U.S. has strengthened its alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and India, and has promoted new groupings like the Quad and AUKUS to counterbalance China.
NATO’s eastward push left little room for dialogue. Washington’s technology restrictions—on semiconductors, 5G, and AI—amount to an effort to slow China’s rise. By simultaneously increasing pressure on both, Washington has created a shared sense of grievance in Moscow and Beijing.
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Economic sanctions and push toward alternatives
Sanctions are Washington’s most frequently used instrument. Against Russia, sweeping financial sanctions have cut its access to Western markets. Against China, targeted restrictions in high-tech sectors aim to curb its industrial and military advancements.
Yet sanctions have also spurred innovation and alternative structures. Russia has become super reliant on China for energy sales, and both are attempting to reduce dependence on the U.S. dollar.
The BRICS group is expanding, and they are establishing alternative economic systems. The US might’ve accidentally pushed them into this by trying to cut them off from the global financial system.
Military signaling and strategic anxiety
The frequency and scale of China-Russia joint military exercises are on the rise. From naval maneuvers in the Pacific to coordinated air patrols, they’re demonstrating their ability to work together seamlessly.
This growing military alliance is a strategic response to the U.S. presence in the region, which reflects their intent to challenge the existing regional order.
Washington’s response or efforts in order to deter each rival may lead towards the more robust partnership against the U.S. NATO deployments in Eastern Europe and U.S. naval patrols in the South China Sea are justified as defensive measures.
Yet in Moscow and Beijing, they are read as proof that America seeks to contain both simultaneously. Shared insecurity is forging cooperation.
Global South: A battleground for influence
The U.S. tends to see global politics as a showdown between democracies and autocracies, but this thinking might not resonate with many countries in the Global South. They would rather not be obliged to choose, and instead, are deciding their own paths.
China and Russia did not let go of this opportunity. They are leveraging the BRI, arms sales, and mutual diplomatic support to expand influence.
The more Washington pressures smaller states to align with the West, the more room it leaves for Beijing and Moscow to position themselves as champions of multipolarity. Far from isolating the “authoritarian axis,” U.S. rhetoric may be alienating the very swing states whose support it needs.
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Could the U.S. have chosen differently?
It is worth asking whether Washington’s approach has boxed itself into this dilemma. Maybe listening to Russia’s NATO concerns could have changed everything.
If Washington had managed competition with Beijing rather than outright technological decoupling, might China have been less inclined to deepen ties with Moscow?
These ‘what ifs’ might be hypothetical, but they demonstrate how US choices have shaped the world we live in today. It is not to absolve Beijing or Moscow of responsibility—Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea are destabilizing actions.
But it is to recognize that strategy is about outcomes, not intentions. If U.S. actions have had the unintended effect of binding its two rivals closer together, then Washington must reassess its assumptions.
Washington’s dilemma moving forward
The U.S. now has to choose between the two, that is, to amplify animosity and risk strengthening the Beijing-Moscow alliance, or ease up and risk being viewed as weak by everyone.
The US needs a nuanced strategy that tackles the unique challenges from both Russia as well as from China. This could mean working with Russia on specific issues like arms control while confronting China from gaining regional influence and collaborating on global issues.
In the long run, the U.S. must decide whether its goal is to prevent the rise of a China–Russia partnership, or to manage it in ways that reduce its impact. Trying to “contain” both simultaneously risks creating the very bloc politics of the Cold War that Washington insists it wishes to avoid.
The tightening strategic collaboration between Beijing and Moscow is not an accident, it is, at least in part, a response to U.S. policy choices. By applying simultaneous pressure on both rivals, Washington has left them with every incentive to find strength in each other.
The question, then, is not only how to counter this partnership, but whether Washington’s own approach has been fuelling it. If the U.S. continues to see the world through the lens of containment, it may find itself confronting exactly what it most fears: a united authoritarian front.
The test of American statecraft will be whether it can adapt-moving from a reactive stance to a more nuanced strategy that prevents today’s uneasy partnership from hardening into tomorrow’s alliance.
*The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of TDI.
Sadia Sohail
Sadia Sohail is an MPhil student of Strategic Studies at National Defense University (NDU), Islamabad, with a bachelor's in International Relations from NUML. She can be reached at sadiasohail010622@gmail.com
