Terrorist threats have resurfaced in Pakistan owing to the political and economic instability in the country, specifically in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Comprehensive countermeasures may be the answer to countering the Islamic State’s (IS) regional affiliate, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP).
ISKP has now switched its strategy from controlling territory to conducting urban, hybrid, or guerilla warfare. It poses a serious security threat to the state of Pakistan and seeks to disrupt the state.
In Pakistan, the Islamic State’s network today is dominated by two factions. The first consists of former TTP (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan) cadres who are predominantly Salafis from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) Province. The second comprises anti-Shia sectarian elements active in southern Balochistan Province.
The Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) uses propaganda to carve out new space in Pakistan and Afghanistan in an already crowded jihadi landscape. It uses popular media and promotes a distinct narrative of Salafi-jihadism tailored to local preferences and focused on specific themes.
Alongside its operational activities and recruitment efforts, the Islamic State has heavily prioritized its propaganda output and media operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. ISKP centralized its media and propaganda operations under Al-Azaim Media Foundation, which is the group’s central media arm.
ISKP has boosted both its militant attacks and its media warfare campaign. ISKP mouthpiece Al-Azaim publishes propaganda material in its bid to disseminate its narrative. The central feature of the ISKP narrative are its claim that the group represents the heirs of the global jihad that al-Qaeda abandoned.
With the Islamic State expanding its presence in Pakistan and it is assumed that this threat emanates mainly, if not exclusively, from the Islamic State’s Afghanistan-based cadres. Islamic State–related terrorism in the Pakistan has been the product of sympathizers to the group and through operatives trained in Afghanistan or virtual planners based in that region.
ISKP’s alarming potential calls for Pakistan to take a variety of countermeasures, including even limited counterterrorism cooperation with the Afghan Taliban. ISKP has aimed at challenging the Afghan Taliban. Countering the threat posed by the ISKP in Pakistan is a complex challenge that requires a comprehensive and multi-pronged approach.
To effectively root out the ISKP from the region, Pakistan should consider implementing the following measures:
Pakistan may explore the possibility of establishing small-scale counterterrorism cooperation with the Afghan Taliban. Despite the politically sensitive nature of such a move, Pakistan should explore the possibility of taking advantage of the fragmented nature of the Afghan Taliban to establish small-scale cooperation on issues exclusively related to counterterrorism.
With a challenging operational environment in Afghanistan, Pakistan has few other options than engaging the Afghan Taliban to counter a common enemy. The Taliban as a whole has a strong interest in combating the ISKP. Such cooperation may involve obtaining information about terrorist elements, and engage in collaboration that strengthens the Taliban’s capability to thwart the ISKP fighters.
As a first step, such cooperation could involve sharing and verifying intelligence to guide Pakistan’s kinetic operations. Pakistan may expand its counterterrorism operations, prevent violent extremism PVE and offer assistance, including signal and human intelligence and PVE expertise to tackle threats from ISKP and associated networks and build capacity to demobilize domestic extremist networks.
Moreover, Pakistan can strengthen intelligence sharing by improving intelligence coordination and intel circulation between various national and regional security agencies. Effective intelligence sharing can help identify ISKP cells, leadership, and their funding sources.
Cybersecurity measures include enhancing cybersecurity measures to monitor and counter ISKP’s online presence, and propaganda. Disrupting their online operations can limit their ability to spread their ideology and recruit new members. This can be done by collaborating with tech companies and international organizations to remove online propaganda, extremist content, and recruitment materials.
Countering the dissemination of online propaganda is paramount, as the extremist groups and networks in Pakistan devote considerable attention to producing and disseminating propaganda designed to spur online radicalization and mobilization.
Consequently, efforts should be made to obstruct the production of extremist propaganda and limit its online circulation on social media and encrypted platforms such as Facebook Messenger and Telegram.
This involves targeting not only the networks producing the propaganda but also supporter networks that are central to disseminating it to a wide audience. Part of this counter-dissemination effort should involve collaborating through established bodies such as the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (an internet industry initiative) and Tech Against Terrorism (a UN-backed initiative) to limit the circulation of content in regional languages.
Enhanced border security and law enforcement by bolstering border security along Pakistan’s borders with Afghanistan and Iran is also essential. The porous borders have allowed militants to move freely, making it crucial to establish stronger control over the movement of individuals and weapons. Strong law enforcement agencies can disrupt and apprehend ISKP operatives within Pakistan’s borders.
Counter-radicalization and de-radicalization programs can be conducted by investing in initiatives to counter radicalization and promote moderation and tolerance. This will include engaging with communities vulnerable to extremist ideologies to prevent recruitment and radicalization of potential ISKP sympathizers and engaging with credible Islamic scholars to issue edicts to disavow the group’s legitimacy.
International cooperation by collaborating closely with neighboring countries, regional organizations, and international partners will be a productive move. Cooperation in intelligence sharing, joint military operations, and capacity-building can significantly weaken the ISKP’s capabilities.
Targeted military operations can be done by conducting intelligence based operations against ISKP hideouts and training camps within Pakistan. Such operations should be intelligence-driven to minimize collateral damage and civilian casualties.
Counter-financing efforts should be made by disrupting the group’s financial networks by identifying and dismantling their funding sources. This may include cracking down on illegal money transfers, charities with suspected links to terrorist financing, and individuals providing financial support to the group, financial tracking and sanctions to track and freeze the financial assets of ISKP and its supporters.
Community engagement can be ensured by involving the local communities in the fight against ISKP by encouraging them to report suspicious activities and individuals. Building trust between security forces and communities is crucial for gathering actionable intelligence. It is also important to promote political pluralism and respect for minorities. As a starting point, Pakistan could explore the possibilities of working with local partners to conduct targeted communication campaigns, warning about the ISKP and promoting alternative future narratives.
Long-term planning and coordination can be accomplished by developing a comprehensive, long-term strategy to counter terrorism in the region. This strategy should involve all relevant stakeholders, including government agencies, civil society organizations, religious leaders, and international partners.
Implementing these measures collectively and consistently is crucial for Pakistan’s efforts to effectively counter and ultimately eliminate the ISKP from the region. It requires a sustained commitment to security, diplomacy, and addressing the underlying causes of extremism. As this risk merits it to be taken seriously as an immediate threat to Pakistan from ISKP.
*The author is a distinguished strategic affairs specialist based in Islamabad.
**The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of The Diplomatic Insight. The organization neither endorses nor assumes any responsibility for the content of this article.
