International relations are increasingly characterized by the formation and contestation of blocs. The unipolar domination of the United States post-Cold War has been replaced by a reality of emerging powers and regional blocs seeking to redefine the status quo. This competition is most visible within the overlapping frameworks of BRICS, the Quad, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) which represent divergent visions of global order.
For South Asia, a region situated at the nexus of great power competition and regional insecurity, these geopolitically rival frameworks offer both strategic advantages and hurdles. Nations like India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka navigate a constant trade-off between maintaining security, economic participation, and strategic independence.
Originally, BRICS was composed of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, and has expanded in 2024 to include new members such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the UAE. The BRICS forum positions itself as the leader of the Global South. Its primary goals include restructuring the world economic system, reducing reliance on the IMF and World Bank, and promoting multipolarity.
BRICS countries constitute over 40% of the world’s population and approximately 32% of global GDP in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms, making them a significant counterbalance to Western-led frameworks. The establishment of the New Development Bank (NDB) in 2015 was a practical measure toward constructing alternative financial institutions. Nevertheless, BRICS, owing to internal contradictions, notably the India-China strategic rivalry, remains constrained.
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India and China support multipolarity, but India, worried over China’s dominance, views BRICS as a potential vehicle for advancing Chinese expansionism, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China’s ally, Pakistan, despite being excluded from BRICS too, watches in skepticism as India consolidates influence within the bloc, reducing Islamabad’s ability to leverage the platform.
In comparison, the Quad, which includes the United States, India, Japan, and Australia, is specifically formed for countering security challenges posed by China in the Indo-Pacific Region. First convened in 2007, it was revived in 2017 amid growing tensions with Beijing. The Quad has framed its mission around guaranteeing a, “free and open Indo-Pacific.” Its initiatives include safeguarding maritime territory supply chains, critical technology, and infrastructure investment.
While it avoids labeling itself as a military alliance, Beijing sees the Quad as a containment strategy. From the perspective of South Asia, the Quad’s importance is filtered through India’s membership. From New Delhi’s perspective, the Quad alliance is a mechanism to counterbalance China’s rising dominance in the Northern Frontier, the Indian Ocean and the region.
However, India’s participation in the Quad underscores the intricate balancing act of its foreign policy: deepening defense cooperation with the United States, India seeks to avoid conflict with Moscow, a steadfast ally, and maintain its leadership within BRICS and the SCO. For the other small South Asian countries, the Quad’s Indo-Pacific focus raises concerns about maritime security, infrastructure financing access, and partnership with China, which views the region as a major economic partner.
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The SCO embodies another conceptualization of regional order, situated within the framework of Eurasian geopolitics. Created in 2001 by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, it has also expanded to include India, Pakistan, and most recently, Iran. With its agenda focused on counterterrorism, security cooperation, and regional connectivity, the SCO is described as the largest regional organization in terms of geographical scope and the population it covers.
It has almost 3.5 billion people, which is approximately 45% of the world population. For South Asia, SCO membership simultaneously offers India and Pakistan a unique venue, albeit rarely, where the two countries seated as equals. Pakistan regards the SCO as a natural extension of its partnership with China and as a gateway to Central Asia. India, despite unease with China’s dominance, values the SCO as a means to engage Russia, access Central Asian energy resources, and counterbalance its regional presence.
Nevertheless, the SCO has faced critiques on its lack of cohesion and effectiveness. The focus on security, especially counterterrorism, appeals to both India and Pakistan. However, the abiding mutual suspicion stands in the way of the forum serving as a useful conflict resolution tool for the two. Instead, it risks becoming another venue for rhetorical competition.
These three groupings showcase the fragmented and contested conflict of the current global order. Each of the three groupings such as BRICS, Quad and SCO, have their particular focus. For example, BRICS highlights a need to reform the global economy while SCO, as the embodiment of Eurasian security, focuses on South Asian cooperation.
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From the intersection of these three groupings, South Asia sits at a strategically difficult position. India emerges as the singular standout. It, being the only country spanning across all three blocs, accounts for this phenomenon. It is conditioned by BRICS and SCO where China dominates, while its membership to Quad and its Western-led strategic architecture allows it to integrate with the West.
This showcases India’s decision making and attempts to remain neutral, in what India calls, “multi-alignment.” This foreign policy is aimed at maximizing freedom with forming alliances handled deliberately. This strategy attempts to balance global influences while maintaining domestic strengths. However, this juggling act contains a myriad of contradictions.
For example, India’s participation of Quad joint naval exercises such as Malabar in the region co-exsists with Brics and SCO, simultaneously aggravating China. India’s reliance on Russian energy also directly opposes the US sanctions on Russia. Each of these contradictions illustrate the strain of India’s attempt to please everyone.
Pakistan’s perspective is shaped by its geopolitical alignment with China. With strained ties to Washington and being excluded from BRICS, Islamabad views the SCO as its principal multilateral forum, providing both geopolitical legitimacy and connectivity via the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). However, heavy reliance on China constrains strategic flexibility.
Relations with India mean that any regional integration project under the SCO is stalled due to bilateral hostages. Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are more cautious as they balance between Chinese economic incentives, Indian regional dominance, and Western engagement. Their strategic positioning highlights the predicaments of smaller states caught between the rivalries of major powers and the competing intentions of powerful countries.
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The cumulative statistic highlights the increasing importance of these alliances. In addition to Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the UAE, BRICS+ also includes Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the UAE, which collectively accounts for close to 46 percent of the world’s oil production. Members of the Quad, through its associates, account for more than 35 percent of global GDP.
Additionally, the SCO, along with its Central Asian states rich in energy resources, controls areas crucial to land-based transportation between Europe and Asia. Nevertheless, all three blocks face internal schisms and competing priorities. BRICS suffers from the Sino-Indian rivalry, the Quad from India’s reluctance to fully integrate with the Western bloc, and the SCO from India-Pakistan rivalry. These divisions impede their capacity to act as unified, rule-shaping systems.
For South Asia, the geopolitical dilemma is not whether to exclusively align itself with one grouping, but how to balance the competing demands of all three. The danger stems from overcommitting to any single order, which might reduce flexibility in a dynamic multipolar environment. A strictly BRICS- or SCO-centric approach would invite South Asia to China’s orbit, compromising strategic autonomy while inviting Western resistance.
Overdependence on the Quad would risk estranging China, a key trade partner and regional player. The optimal approach, especially for India and the smaller South Asian states, is to sustain multi-vector engagement: reap economic advantages from BRICS, secure dialogues via the Quad, and tap into Eurasian connectivity through the SCO. This approach demands shrewd diplomacy and strategic consistency in policymaking, coupled with the resolve to withstand fleeting short-term populist pressures.
The existence of BRICS, Quad, and SCO all at once indicates that the world is not progressing toward a singular order, but entering an era of contested pluralities. South Asia, as participant and stage of these contests, must understand that strategic autonomy is not equivalent to isolation, and alignment does not mean dependence. Strategic alignment translates to carefully tailoring decisions to maximize benefits and minimize vulnerabilities.
The goal is to not become a pawn in the rivalries of major powers, to instead become actively self-determined and influence how the region evolves. Vision, coherence, and most importantly, the political audacity to reframe from short-term solutions and focus on the long-term framework of sustainable security and enduring prosperity is what this region needs.
*The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of TDI.
Tahira Mushtaq
Tahira Mushtaq is a student of International Relations at the University of Sargodha. Her areas of interest include defense, security studies, and foreign policy.
