A recent suicide bombing near Islamabad’s District Judicial Complex, the first such attack in over a decade, has once again drawn global attention to Pakistan’s ongoing struggle with terrorism. While the incident has sparked fears of a resurgence in suicide terrorism, experts caution against seeing it in isolation.
Historically, suicide terrorism has been most effective not as isolated acts, but as part of sustained, coordinated campaigns. In the context of Pakistan’s improved security apparatus and extensive counterterrorism operations, a full-scale return to the deadly patterns of the past appears unlikely, but the nation is far from safe.
The Early Years: 2002–2006
Suicide terrorism emerged in Pakistan in 2002, coinciding with the US-led invasion of Afghanistan. Initial attacks targeted foreign nationals and diplomatic installations, signaling militants’ adoption of a tactic widely used by global jihadist organizations. Between 2002 and 2006, at least 25 suicide bombings took place, gradually shifting focus to politically significant targets, including high-profile assassination attempts on figures such as General Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz. Although these attacks were relatively limited in number, they laid the groundwork for a period of dramatic escalation.
The Surge: 2007–2013
The military operation at Islamabad’s Lal Masjid, or Red Mosque, in 2007 acted as a catalyst for a dramatic rise in suicide attacks. That year alone saw 56 bombings that claimed more than 1,100 lives. The subsequent assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto further demonstrated the lethal potential of the tactic.
During this period, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) became the primary theaters of conflict, accounting for roughly 60% of all suicide attacks. Militants increasingly targeted military and law enforcement infrastructure rather than civilians, a strategic shift prompted by both public backlash in Punjab and Sindh and the desire to assert dominance over rival groups.
By 2008, Pakistan had surpassed Iraq and Afghanistan in terms of fatalities from suicide attacks, highlighting the severity of the crisis. High-profile attacks during this period, such as the Marriott Hotel bombing in Islamabad, underscored the willingness of militant groups to strike urban centers and high-value targets with devastating effect. The escalation during these years set the stage for one of the deadliest phases of militancy in Pakistan’s history.
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Decline: 2014–2020
Following the Army Public School attack in Peshawar in 2014, Pakistan witnessed a marked decline in suicide terrorism. Several factors contributed to this downturn. Extensive military operations in FATA disrupted militant networks, while militants lost secure bases within Pakistan and were forced to retreat into Afghanistan. The degradation of recruitment pipelines and logistical networks further hampered their operational capabilities.
Equally significant was the shift in public sentiment. The unprecedented scale of civilian casualties, particularly among children, generated widespread condemnation, with religious leaders and clerics openly denouncing suicide attacks as un-Islamic. By 2019–2020, Pakistan experienced some of the lowest levels of terrorist activity since 2006, with suicide bombings increasingly rare and militants instead adopting IEDs, ambushes, and targeted assassinations.
Resurgence and Tactical Adaptation: 2021–2025
Despite these gains, the years 2021 to 2025 have seen a notable resurgence in militant activity. According to the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) 2025, terrorism-related deaths in Pakistan rose 45% in 2024 to 1,081, while the number of terror incidents exceeded 1,000 for the first time. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has emerged as the fastest-growing terrorist group, responsible for over half of the fatalities recorded during the year.
The surge continued into 2025. The first quarter alone saw an 81% increase in terror-related incidents, with 80 attacks resulting in 218 deaths. KP remained a primary target, reporting five suicide attacks among 756 terrorism-related cases recorded by local police in the first half of the year. March 2025 saw the sharpest spike in violence since 2014, with 105 militant attacks, including six suicide bombings that claimed 59 lives.
Several high-profile suicide attacks underscored the persistent threat. On 28 February, a suicide bombing at the Darul Uloom Haqqania seminary in KP killed eight people, including the seminary’s head. On 21 May, a suicide vehicle attack on a school bus in Khuzdar, Balochistan, killed at least 11, including children, and wounded 53 others. While these attacks were tragic, they represented a decline in frequency compared to past peaks, suggesting that militants are adapting their strategies rather than returning to full-scale suicide campaigns.
The Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS) reported that suicide attacks actually declined in 2024 compared to 2023, dropping from 29 to 17 incidents with 139 deaths. This indicates that although terrorism remains a significant challenge, suicide bombing as a preferred tactic has diminished, replaced increasingly by remote attacks, targeted killings, and improvised explosive devices.
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What Lies Ahead
Looking forward, the trajectory of suicide terrorism in Pakistan remains uncertain but predictable to some extent. The reorganization of the TTP and the continued existence of militant safe havens in Afghanistan represent a fundamental threat. Intermittent suicide attacks remain possible, particularly if security measures, surveillance, and border management are not consistently enforced.
Analysts suggest several likely scenarios. One involves sustained low-level terrorism, characterized by sporadic incidents without escalating into nationwide campaigns. Another scenario involves tactical hybridization, where militant groups blend a few high-impact suicide missions with cheaper, lower-risk methods such as IEDs, sniper attacks, and ambushes. A more optimistic outcome would be the complete tactical abandonment of suicide bombing, contingent on continued public condemnation, societal pressure, and religious opposition, which could severely undermine recruitment efforts.
A full resurgence of suicide terrorism remains a worst-case scenario. For this to occur, militants would need to reestablish secure cross-border sanctuaries, gain local support, and exploit gaps in Pakistan’s security apparatus—a complex and unlikely convergence. From its emergence in 2002, through its deadly peak, subsequent decline, and the recent partial resurgence, suicide terrorism in Pakistan illustrates both the resilience of militant networks and the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures.
While the threat remains real, the evolution of tactics—from large-scale suicide attacks to more adaptable and less visible methods—suggests that Pakistan is navigating a new phase in its ongoing struggle against extremism. The next few years will test the nation’s ability to sustain public resilience, maintain security, and prevent militant groups from regaining the operational freedom that once allowed suicide terrorism to dominate its urban and tribal landscapes.
*The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own and do not represent TDI. The contributor is responsible for the originality of this piece.
Usman Anwar
Usman Anwar is a prospective M.Phil. scholar in Politics and International Relations. His research interests include security studies, maritime affairs, comparative politics, human rights, and climate change. His academic portfolio includes 7 published articles in reputable journals (Category Q-2 and Y) and a book review (Category Q-3). He can be reached at usmananwar2023@gmail.com
