Asad Ali
In recent years, great change has been seen in Indian foreign policy, particularly with Russia. Earlier Russia stood more importantly for India as a reliable strategic ally who provided technology support in defense, energy sources and political backing. But now, war in Ukraine, emergent Indian relations with the West, and a series of strategic restructuring have disturbed this equation. Invisible and obvious activities demonstrate that India is socializing away from Russia, which implies that India is shifting its strategic orientation closer to that of US and other liberal Western democracies.
India’s shift away from Russia is not hasty. Another major case of such transition is India’s decision to exit out from Fifth-Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) programme with Russia, which was a planned plan to work on a next generation fighter aircraft for the Indian Air Force. Due to an inability to meet the desired capabilities of aircraft, India bought 36 Rafael fighter jets from France in 2016 also shifting from traditional Russian options such as Sukhoi or MiG aircrafts. This was not about merely broadening the range of military hardware, but about tilting India further to the western side of defense systems.
India has been gradually turning away from Russia as a receiver of defense technology. Lately, India has concentrated more on buying more sophisticated equipment from US like Apache and Chinook helicopters, P-8I maritime reconnaissance aircrafts and most significantly the MQ-9 Reaper Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.
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The core of axiological shift is India’s rising engagement in international decision-making process through multilateral and alliance systems that promote its perceived proximity to West. Such a platform is Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), an alliance of US, Japan, Australia and India. It is a political and security grouping and primarily targets security in the Indo-Pacific region where special emphasis is on containing the spreading power of China. Russia has different agenda and is many times more interested in its own affairs, especially in Europe & CARs. Increasing Indian participation in QUAD, US-Indian joint military exercises as well as US-Australian- Japanese military exercises are indicative of India increasing tendency to side with western powers, which in many cases are strategic rivals of Russia.
Moreover, over the recent years India has strengthened its diplomatic and military relations with the West due to explosive economic cooperation with US and EU. Although trade between India and Russia currently continues to be massive, it has been gradually declining in recent years, this at a time that India is expanding its economic cooperation with the Western countries. India conducted $61.4 billion trade with Russia in 2024 while it’s $77.52 billion with US with just a difference of one year trade of US $ 40.77 billion. This unprecedented upturn in trade with the US underlines the shifting of focus of the Indian economy from Russia to the west for business as well as political relations.
Another indication of India’s change of sides has been its response or rather lack of it to the war waged by Russia on Ukraine. India, though did not outrightly oppose Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, has effectively been diplomatically disassociating itself with Russia on the international stage. India did not back Russia at UN or in any special way provide any assistance to Russia’s military.
In cybersecurity as well, India has also tilted toward the Western countries. Fears of cyber warfare and fake news, especially if associated with Moscow’s relations with Beijing, have raised eyebrows in New Delhi for deepening its relations with Moscow. Therefore, India has really ramped up efforts in building its indigenous cyber capacity and diversifying its cybersecurity partners. This pivot reflects New Delhi’s increasing discomfort with Moscow’s role in regional and global cyber warfare, especially as far as Russia-China entente affects India’s core cyber security concerns.
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That perhaps is the most apparent fact of Indian foreign policy with Russia – it is all about India first. Evidently, India has shifted its foreign policy direction from allegiance to any particular ally to nationalism. This pragmatism is evident in its approach to Russia. Change is the new order in India’s foreign policy, one in which the distance from Russia is growing and the embracing of America and other western nations is growing. This reorientation, however, is not straightforward equation as India strives to manage its relations with not only Russia but also with the western countries. The decreasing importance of the India-Russia relationship could be seen by the fact that India becomes more active in security structures such as QUAD as well as increasing military cooperation with western countries. Although this change makes analytical sense for the long-term strategic interests of India, it proves the realities of the multi-polar ‘world of no permanency, no principles, no morality, and no altruism.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official stance of The Diplomatic Insight or its editorial board. The content is provided for informational purposes only and should not be construed as an endorsement of any particular viewpoint, policy, or action.
