On May 8th, during his state visit to Russia, Chinese President Xi and his Russian counterpart, President Putin, issued a joint statement in which both sides vowed to defend the world order in line with multilateralism and the fundamentals of international law.
On the occasion of the founding of the United Nations and the 80th anniversary of the victory in WWII, it is worth discussing the logic behind the heads of China and Russia exhibiting a firm consensus and strong resolve to uphold and maintain global strategic stability amid the uncertain scenario of geopolitical competition.
According to the statement and previous joint documents on the subject of common security and the principled approaches set out therein, China and Russia have opined that, first and foremost, no state should pursue exclusive security at the expense of, and to the detriment of, the security of other states. Since the destinies of the peoples of all countries are interrelated, they are required to adhere to the principle of equal and indivisible security at global and regional levels and move to build comprehensive, integrated, and sustainable security all over the world on a collective basis.
“Strategic stability” is one of the most used and misused concepts of strategic equilibrium in arms control. It was originally rooted in the idea of the balance of power in the classical diplomacy of Europe and then evolved into mutual nuclear deterrence during the Cold War, which was characterized by the bipolar dominance of the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
According to a strategic report titled “An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War” (1985), to avoid nuclear war, it was key to maintain the capability of military forces and the credibility of political intentions and resolve.
But it was equally important to be aware that mutual assured destruction (MAD) refers to a condition, rather than America’s military strategy or objective. Put simply, the rationale behind the policymaking elites was to make all earnest efforts to avoid “seeking a first-strike capability” and “planning for a nuclear demonstration shot in Europe [or Asia]” (G. Allison, 1985). Given this, the nuclear-weapon powers’ shared concern brings forth a powerful incentive to work together in maintaining strategic equilibrium.
The statement by China and Russia exhibited common concern with the U.S. commitment to a “no peer” approach in foreign affairs, as it is seen as one of the most pressing strategic risks to be addressed urgently and properly.
As the largest nuclear-weapon state, the United States has destabilized the already existing strategic equilibrium through the deliberate deployment of nuclear warheads to the frontiers of other nuclear-weapon states in an attempt to establish or expand permanent footholds in areas that are particularly sensitive to them.
All of these are intended to project military power, exert maximum coercion, and commit other hostile activities—for example, “to perform decapitating and disarming strikes while enhancing capabilities for missile interception.” What the U.S. has pursued naturally undermines the core interests of states generally, and of nuclear-weapon states in particular.
It is true that China and Russia are deeply concerned with the ‘provocative activities’ of the U.S. in seeking nuclear preponderance, which are seen to undermine regional stability and global security. Over the past decade, the U.S. and its core ally have agreed to plans and practical steps to deploy, outside their national territories, ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles with short flight times to a wide range of targets located inside the territories of “CRINK” (China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea).
Moreover, the U.S.-led West has invested in, developed, procured, and emplaced newly advanced long-range missile systems of the same class or more advanced ones within the territories of their non-nuclear allies or partners—“in the framework of concepts involving the acquisition of counterforce systems for deep precision strikes,” “kill chains,” “counterstrike capabilities,” etc.
Similarly, for the U.S. and its core allies around the world, they have had their own core interests and legitimate security concerns.
First, they argue that Russia still possesses a formidable nuclear arsenal, while China is seen as the pacing nuclear power backed by its rising economy. In 2020, a report from the trans-Atlantic bloc argued that the rise of China and its increasing solidarity with Russia contributed to the global equilibrium shifting in favor of Sino-Russian geopolitical stakes in Eurasia.
In both history and reality, alliances can be formal or informal collective security arrangements between two or more parties. This narrative helps to clarify what China and Russia have referred to as a comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination, rather than a formal alliance.
Since 2022, the Collective West has formally defined Russia as the immediate threat to Europe and China as the systemic rival to the rules-based world order. The war launched by Russia in Ukraine has only accelerated the existing process of polarizing the world between the Sino-Russian entente and the U.S.-led global alliance system.
Now that there are no “guarantees” of perpetual peace in this world, only an evolving mix of deterrence and diplomacy—along with an ongoing commitment to talk through crisis control rather than talk at one another—can advance the security of all countries.
Concerning global strategic stability among nuclear-weapon powers, diplomacy aims to reduce mutual risks while looking forward to bringing about changes in the major nuclear powers’ relations, as was done during the Cold War.
In sum, what China and Russia have presented is an appeal to other nuclear-weapon powers to take responsibility for international security and address global issues, including strategic equilibrium.
In this context, Beijing and Moscow have denounced the “Golden (Iron) Dome for America” programme, designed to establish an unconstrained, global, and multi-domain missile defense system to protect against any missile threats, including all types of missiles from “peer and near-peer adversaries.”
In so doing, the U.S. and its core allies have de facto refused to recognize the existence of the inseparable interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, which is one of the central and fundamental principles of maintaining global strategic stability.
*The views expressed by the author are their own and do not necessarily reflect the position of the publication.
Wang Li
The writer is Professor of International Studies, Jilin International Studies University (JISU)
